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tIf the world was perfect, it wouldn’t be.
—Lawrence Peter “Yogi” Berra
A well-known vascular surgeon practices at a state
university hospital that serves a mixture of insured and
indigent patients. He trained before endovascular tech-
niques were available and chose to continue with open
techniques exclusively. Further, he has a statewide reputa-
tion of accepting difficult cases unsuitable for endovascular
therapy. Other vascular surgeons refer complicated Medic-
aid patients from within the state and also from surround-
ing states. As one might suspect, he has become very busy.
His generosity costs the hospital an average of $25,000 per
Medicaid case. Past deficits were made up from discretion-
ary state funds, but since the recession, state budgets are
fixed. The hospital CFO established a committee to con-
sider which programs to discontinue. The other programs
on the table provide for more essential services. What
should the committee recommend to the CFO about this
surgeon’s practice?
A. Patients he treats likely would not receive lifesaving care
without him. Let him continue.
B. Increase charges for the insured to make up the differ-
ence.
C. He should not be allowed to operate on patients from
out of state.
D. He should be restricted from operating on any Medic-
aid patients.
E. Form a committee to screen his cases, letting him only
operate on the low-risk cases.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jvs.2012.08.047Medical financing is fast approaching a tipping point,
ith health legislation mandating more care and unsustain-
ble national finances racing onward.1 The Office of the
ctuary, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, pre-
ict that when the “[Un]Affordable Health Care Act” fully
nleashes in 2 years, the total cost is estimated to reach $3.1
rillion.2 The federal government will pay almost half. In
erspective, the income—not expenditures—of the federal
overnment in 2010 totaled $2.5 trillion. Legislation has
etained inefficient medical insurers but limited their influ-
nce on medical care delivery. Medical institutions and
hysicians remain, as they have always been, the bulwark
etween the government and patient care. The ability to
ontinue in this role is now being sorely tested.
Unlike almost every other financial decision, medical
are decisions, except perhaps cosmetic therapies, are not
omparative prioritizations. Life and health concerns are
reconditions for seeking medical care so that the general
onsensus is that they are imperative. Unlike other services
n which the consumer determines his or her own needs,
omeone else determines medical necessity for the patient.
ost is often undetermined at the onset. Insurance will
over most of the cost, but often a diminishing share.
atients are assumed to have autonomy when making med-
cal care decisions, another assumption that is sorely tested.
Up until the recent past, decisions about which patients
eceived costly medical therapy primarily involved scarce
edical resources, such as organ transplantation, and those
ho would benefit the most were objective selections. A
ew era approaches when expensive therapies will be re-
eived based on comparative cost-effectiveness. Public
edical institutions with large indigent populations have
ad to choose which extra programs were affordable. Ra-
ioning (denying patients what is needed in deliberative
linical judgment) is well established as a pejorative con-
erning medical care, but unpaid medical care is not unlim-
ted, and public institutions, such as VeteransHealth Affairs
ospitals, control costs by subtle limitations of accessibility.
Medicine is the one profession that seems to ignore
The Law of Diminishing Returns.” The availability of
echnologically advanced therapies has particularly in-
reased utilization of medical resources in terminally ill
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October 20121154 Jones and McCulloughcancer patients without necessarily lengthening their lives
or improving their comfort. For example, aggressive chem-
ical and radiation therapy after recurrence and advanced
pancreatic cancer metastases typically buys the patient little
or no extension of life, but assures additional suffering.3
Berwick and Hackbarth4 calculate that 34% of the cost of
medical care is from overtreatment, fraud, abuse, and other
types of waste. Surgeons have a firewall protecting them
from several of the types of waste mentioned: they are a
referral specialty, with another physician who will not ben-
efit financially proposing surgical therapy; and most sur-
geons are not regularly attendings at end-of-life.
We introduced the ethical concept of co-fiduciary re-
sponsibility to address shared responsibility of physicians
and their medical institutions for the population of patients
served by the institution.5 These include scheduling, cre-
dentialing, and financial processes. Surgeons have co-
fiduciary obligations and duties with their institutions and
other health professionals for the patients served at the
institution. Obligations take the form of individual prom-
ises such as attending committee meetings. Duties are
imposed by the institution for actions necessary for an
organization to function. Duties have enforcement penal-
ties if the responsibility is not met. For example, it is the
duty of every practicing physician to maintain a medical
license. Failure results in loss of privileges.
This case highlights a co-fiduciary responsibility of sur-
geons and hospitals of growing importance. The surgeon
does not have a duty to make the hospital profitable but
does have a duty to protect the fiscal viability of the hospital
so that it can discharge its co-fiduciary obligation to see to
it that all of its patients receive good medical care.
The hospital’s appropriate financial interest extends
beyond solvency; capital resources are necessary to main-
tain modern equipment and facilities. As medical costs
continue to exceed inflation and GDP increases, medical
institutions have seen payers continually implementing
plans to control cost. It is a financial tennis match. But now
unlike the past, because the entire game has shifted, there
will be multiple balls thrown onto the court. As a conse-
quence, the legitimate fiscal interests of a hospital need to
be taken into account in setting organizational policy on
who should be admitted as a patient.
Option A illustrates the holdover on the abundance
paradigm. The three decades of American economic abun-
dance after World War II and the low costs of medical care
during this period obscured the importance of co-fiduciary
responsibility. The permanent changes wrought by the
return of global competition and the fragility of capitalist
economies combine to make co-fiduciary financial respon-
sibility unavoidable.
Option B appears attractive because it addresses the
reality of economic constraints. However, given the reali-
ties of medical indigence required to qualify forMedicaid in
most states, increasing charges to the surgeon’s moneyed
population will not produce revenues sufficient to offset the
hospital’s losses. There are serious practical limitations to
5arketplace solutions in health care. Justice being to each
ccording to what they deserve is not necessarily parallel
ith wealth redistribution.
Option C is a legitimate concern because the state that
unds the hospital theoretically has responsibility for its
esidents but not for the residents of other, neighboring
tates; that is how the federal system of self-government
orks in theUnited States. However, the hospital’s respon-
ibility, and especially the surgeon’s responsibilities, do not
epend on addresses. Fiduciary professionalism has re-
uired medical care be given according to need established
n deliberative clinical judgment, no other criteria—except
carce medical resources. When resources are short, routine
edical care could become classed as scarce to a degree.
owever, state of residence should not be a criterion in this
ase. The state government has the prerogative to prohibit
ut-of-state Medicaid care. Should it do so, then the hos-
ital has adequate policy guidance and could justifiably
estrict the surgeon’s practice to in-state patients, to whom
here is an obligation to provide care using state resources.
Option D is ethically unacceptable inasmuch as the
ospital receives funding from the state and, therefore, has
mission to serve the state’s sick poor. Option D also fails
o recognize that the hospital has some, but reasonably
imited, responsibility to provide access to the surgeon’s
n-state Medicaid patients. The challenge is how to do so in
oth a professionally and fiscally responsible manner.
Professional responsibility requires recognition that all
neurysms are not equal threats to life. Aneurysms’ risks can
e classified according to size, location, symptomatology,
nd comorbidities. The hospital could calculate limits of
osses that ould be absorbed and a committee of vascular
urgeons, including the “Medicaid surgeon,” could prior-
tize the cases. They could identify other surgeons in other
nstitutions who would be willing to share the burden.
ption E becomes the basis for the committee’s work:
roposing a policy for the hospital and all of its vascular
urgeons to make sure that no needed surgical manage-
ent of in-state Medicaid beneficiaries is foregone.
As Yogi’s witticism recognized: there is no perfect
orld, especially in medicine. Physicians of all nationalities
nd beliefs have labored over three millennia to make the
ystem of medical care as perfect as possible. How to
ontinue to do so under the constraints of co-fiduciary
esponsibility becomes a major task of surgical ethics.
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